Scholarship on the social function in Argentina has been understandably limited because until recently it has been difficult to extricate the historical study of property as a social function from this constitution and its political movement and moment (Ramella, 299) . The seeds of the social function property were planted early in Argentina, but their yield was somewhat late for the region and not as lasting as in other countries.
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the most important Argentine precursors to America. Although variations of the social function of property were found throughout the region in the twentieth century, the history of its adoption is unique in each country's legal and political moment.
I. Precursors
Before assessing the place of the social function of property in the Constitution of 1949, a few observations on the previous constitution, the Argentine Constitution of 1853/1860, are 3 necessary. 1 The Constitution of 1853/1860 was crafted from the work of one of Argentina's great jurists, Juan Bautista Alberdi (Mirow 2015, 159-163; Mirow 2016b) . In Bases y puntos de partida para la organización política de la República Argentina, the most important book on comparative Latin American constitutions of its time, Alberdi advocated a new Argentine constitution that would promote economic growth, foreign investment, and increased population through immigration. Alberdi criticized both the Spanish colonial law (derecho indiano) and the constitutions of early Latin American independent republics for neglecting these essential aspects of political and social progress (Mirow 2015, 160-161) . Alberdi and the resulting constitution he championed adopted classical liberal principles and subjective rights, including the right to property, a non-interventionist state, and foreign investment. His stance on property was not surprising; an unlimited and absolute right to property was by far the predominant conception of property available to any drafter of the period (Levaggi, (123) (124) (125) (126) (127) 130) .
Adopting this classical liberal concept of property, the Constitution of 1853/1860, Article 17 states:
Property is inviolable, and no one living in the Confederation may be deprived of it, unless by virtue of a judgment based on law.
Expropriation for public use should be determined by law and prior indemnification. . . . 1 The Constitution bears two years because it was first adopted by the Argentine Confederation excluding Buenos Aires. When Buenos Aires adopted the constitution, it became the constitution of the entire Argentine republic.
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Thus, property had to be inviolable, and the owner of property had to have the fullest range of rights to use and to dispose of it (Koenig, (103) (104) . Here, Argentine constitutional law clearly echoed the French Civil Code of 1804 (the Code Napoléon) which stated in Article 544:
Property is the right to enjoy and to dispose of things in the most absolute manner, provided that one does not undertake a usage prohibited by law (Mirow translation).
Similarly, a few decades later, the Argentine Civil Code of 1871, in Article 2513, was consistent in its enunciation of an absolute unfettered right to property:
Inherent in property is the right to possess the thing, to dispose or to benefit from it, to use it, or to enjoy it according to the will of the owner. He may exploit it, degrade it, or destroy it (Pasquale, 102, Mirow translation (Mirow 2010, 198-199, 207) .
In bold contrast to the accepted characterizations of property established in works of classical liberalism, civil codes, and constitutions, Duguit objected, "But property is not a right;
it is a social function" (Duguit, 21) . With this assertion, he launched into uncharted waters and carefully navigated between established notions of an absolute right to property and socialist theories that sought to abolish all forms of private ownership. This statement reflected theoretical and methodological trends of the time towards the "social".
His sixth and final lecture of the series was the most unsettling and enduring. There he explained that "I have developed the idea that capitalist property, and particularly real property, is increasingly less of a subjective individual right and more of a social function" and he repeated and rephrased the idea this way "Property is no longer the subjective right of the owner; it is the social function of the possessor of wealth" (Duguit 1920, iv, v) . This lecture and its subsequent publication became the seminal source for the doctrine of the social function of property (Mirow 2010, 199-200 Hayem served as the foundation for Duguit's social function of property (Mirow 2010, 200-202, 213-220, 225 (Levaggi, (127) (128) (129) .
In contrast, the works affirming or tacitly accepting a classical liberal absolute right to property set the tone during the period. This was the case, even though deputies at the constituent convention and scholars expounding on property immediately preceding the Constitution of 1949 attempted to justify the social function of property through historical 7 antecedents in Argentina. In the 1910s, socialist ideas of property were relegated to few and academic works outside the main stream of law students, professors, and jurists (Levaggi, (129) (130) (131) . In this atmosphere, it is not surprising that Duguit's complex formulation of the social function of property was unable to make its way into the legal matrix of Argentina when it was expounded in 1911. Although Duguit's theory of property was delivered in Argentina and adopted elsewhere in Latin America shortly after its presentation, his theory remained dormant in Argentina for decades (Mirow 2011) .
II. The Argentine Constitution of 1949
After consolidating power in 1945 and 1946, the Peronist government sought to reshape the national economy and to jettison the classical liberalism of the Constitution of 1853/1860 (Koenig, 85) . In a new democratic structure, the state and property would serve the community and human dignity (Koenig, 89) . By this time, there were many national models to follow, and many incorporated the social function of property. Constitutions from Weimar Germany (1919), Colombia (1945 ), Guatemala (1946 ), Ecuador (1946 ), Peru (1947 ), Bolivia (1947 ), and Italy (1947 , amongst others, offered language explicitly adopting a social function of property or nationalized property. These texts were compiled by José Figuerola and were available to the constituent convention for its use in drafting the constitution (Ramella, (318) (319) (320) Court in which the idea of the social function of property was employed to remedy specific injustices (Ramella, 310, 314, 333, (338) (339) (340) (341) . In 1922, the Argentine Supreme Court of Justice approved a law that permitted Congress to regulate urban leases, a clear step away from liberal principles of property (Diario, vol. 1, 323; Botano and Gallo, xxiv) . And in the 1940s, there were several legislative proposals and acts for agrarian and land reform (Ramella, (342) (343) (344) (345) (346) .
Additionally, proponents of the social function of property unsuccessfully urged this characterization of property during drafting sessions for a new civil code from 1926 until 1936.
The draft code ultimately rejected the formulation; it was never enacted, and the existing code continued to enunciate the classical liberal paradigm of property (Parise, (233) (234) (235) . These small and detached instances of the social function of property in Argentina between Duguit's lectures and the Constitution of 1949 provided little to pave the way for the language that was to be incorporated into the Constitution. These scattered instances of changes in the nature of property in Argentina must be understood in light of Levaggi's assessment that Argentina had few intellectual or legal precursors to the social function of property.
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The Constitution of 1949 was a product of Juan Perón's election as president in 1946.
Reforming society and promoting industrialization, Perón was supported by urban workers and their unions. Perón sought policies to favor all aspects of labor, to effect "social justice", and to aid the poor. He hoped to reassert national sovereignty against foreign encroachments into the country's political and economic life with particular attention paid to sectors controlled by foreign firms such as railroads, power plants, and other public services. (Rock, 214, (260) (261) (262) (263) .
Peronism went deeper than fiscal policy and workers' benefits. As David Rock noted:
Peronism, its constituents claimed, also made a major contribution to the nation's "spiritual" development. In a world divided by the Iron Curtain, the doctrines of justicialismo offered an alternative to both capitalism and communism. To its adherents justicialismo was a social-Christian philosophy rooted in Catholic and
Aristotelian precepts of justice and harmony (Rock, 264) .
Thus, Peronism called for a radical restructuring of Argentine politics, economy, society, and even the relationship between faith and public action. The preamble of the Constitution of 1949 incorporated these themes by declaring a "Nation socially just, economically free, and politically sovereign" (Rock, 289) .
In the process of drafting a new constitution with the political and economic goals of Peronism, Colonel Domingo Mercante, Governor of the province of Buenos Aires and president of the constituent convention, steered the political side of constitution-making (Koenig, 93) .
Arturo Enrique Sampay adeptly led the legal side of drafting the constitution with a cadre of jurists of varying political allegiances, none of with whom Sampay perfectly aligned. He did, however, share with the group a strong sense of nationalism and a Catholicism that had already schooled them in many of the foundational writings of the church's social teaching (Koenig, 95) .
In this way, Sampay's views of constitutionalism and economy were in accord with the cultural and spiritual revolution of Perón's Christian humanism of the 1940s and the social doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church (Madaria, 525, (555) (556) (557) (558) (559) (560) (561) (562) (563) (564) (565) . Christian humanism and neo-Thomism were part of the national spirit, and Sampay shared in these movements (Arias Pelerano, (16) (17) .
The constitution reflected the Church's social doctrine not only in the area of property but also in addressing areas of "special rights" related to work, strikes, family, old age, and education (Madaria, (560) (561) (562) . Sampay, describing later the overall nature of the constitution, wrote:
In summary, the so-called "Constitution of 1949" proposed to make an effective government from the popular sectors, to free the country from imperialism, placing financial resources, natural resources, and the principal goods of production in the control of the state with the goal of organizing them through planning to achieve an independent and harmonious development of the economy that produces modern well-being to all and to each of the members of the community. It attempted, in this way, to establish in Argentina the social revolution needed in the modern world (Sampay 1973, 121-122) .
Peronist drafters did not turn immediately to the social function of property for the Argentine Constitution of 1949. In fact, the first formulation of property in the draft crafted by José Figuerola directly reacted to the text of the prior constitution by negating its fundamental ideas of absolute rights. The draft stated:
Property is neither inviolable nor even untouchable, but simply respected when it is useful not only to the individual but also to the collective (Koenig, 126 ).
Sampay and the constituent convention substantially modified this language to introduce the social function of property. Indeed, the social function of property became the theoretical and ideological core of an entire Chapter of the Preamble of the Constitution entitled "The Social
Function of Property, Capital, and Economic Activity" (Argentine Constitution of 1949, Preamble, Chapter IV, translated in the Appendix). This Chapter has been viewed not only as a constitutional focal point for Argentina in 1949 but also as the core of Peronist political ideology (Koenig, 32) . These aspects were singled out by Sampay as essential features of a constitution that eschewed both the brutalities of unbridled modern capitalism and statist totalitarian (Sampay 1963, 115-116, 121 ).
Central to Peronist constitutionalism, legality, and politics, Chapter IV contains three articles addressing the social function of property, capital, natural resources, and public services.
The core of the Constitution's definition of property is found in Article 38 of the Constitution.
An earlier draft stated that the:
Nation shall guarantee private property as a social function and, as a consequence, the same shall be subject to the contributions, restrictions, and obligations established by law for general utility (Ramella, 302 n8; Mirow's emphasis).
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This text was later changed to the language that would eventually be found in Article 38:
Private property has a social function and, as a consequence, shall be subject to obligations established by law for the common good (Mirow's emphasis) .
This text reveals a minor but extremely important change from the earlier draft submitted by the Peronist Party which equated property with a social function; property now had a social function.
Ramella correctly observed that this change from "as" to "has," importantly shifted property from Duguit's concept of not being a subjective right in itself (using "as") to a juridical object that was limited by certain obligations (using "has") (Ramella, 302) . individual and social, which worked together (Ramella, (305) (306) (307) .
Articles following the adoption of the social function of property reveal that the formulation had clear instrumental aims. This definition of property in the Argentine Constitution of 1949 was not an aspirational statement or broadly based rejection of the absolute right to property without practical consequences. Instead, property's social function had an 13 immediate and contemplated effect on the legal order of ownership and the political structure of the country. As elsewhere in the region, the social function of property was often employed as a necessary step towards or justification for land or agrarian reform (Ankersen and Ruppert, 88-107; Mirow 2004, 219-227) . The social function of property led in subsequent provisions to land reform, the control of capital, and the nationalization of natural resources and public services.
The principle of the social function of property was translated and interpreted by other articles within Chapter IV. The language provided for the expropriation of foreign capital and the nationalization of various sectors of the economy that had heretofore been in private, often foreign, hands. This was an about-face from Alberdi's constitutional vision and Argentina's political policy of encouraging and protecting foreign investment and capital (Koenig, (129) (130) (131) (132) (133) (134) (135) (136) (137) .
In the context of Peronism, the social function of property implicated state control of some aspects of the economy, importantly the provision of public services often provided by foreign companies. The initial draft of the article dealing with state control, Article 40 within the draft of constitutional reform, was the work of José Figuerola from the President's Secretariat, but the final drafting was assigned to Sampay who incorporated the nationalization of public services. When the draft article was published, Perón was besieged by demands from American, British, Italian, and Swiss diplomats to soften the expropriatory aspect of the article. As principal drafters of the constitution, Sampay and Mercante held their ground, and the provisions for nationalization stood (Koenig, (112) (113) . Telephone service, transportation, gas, ports, and railroads -held mostly by foreign interests -were nationalized (Koenig, 163 ). Sampay's unwillingness to yield to external political presures and to soften the application of Article 40 as requested by Perón created a rift between the drafter and the president, and it appears that 14 relations between the two were never as cordial as before. From 1952 to 1973, they did not see each other (Madaria, (547) (548) (552) (553) .
Even with the modification from "as" to "has", the formulation of Article 38 closely followed Duguit's construction of the doctrine. Nonetheless, despite Duguit's historic connection to Argentina, his work was only a minor source that shaped the Peronist ideas of the social function of property.
Well versed in constitutional theory, Sampay did not directly draw on Duguit (Sampay 1973, 6-70 (Koenig, (30) (31) .
Just as the papal encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891) and Duguit's concept of the social function of property sought to establish a third way, a golden mean, between compassionless absolute rights in property under the principles of classical liberalism on one hand and communal and state ownership of all property on the other, Sampay, following tenants of Christian humanism, sought a construction of property that would further the common good and just order (Koenig, 104) . Indeed, it appears that Christian humanism served as a bridge between Sampay's construction of the social function of property and Duguit's original formulation.
Although the Argentine Constitution of 1949 adopted the social function of property, it must be noted at the outset that in the entire body of reported sessions of the constituent convention, Duguit is only mentioned once by name in relation to the social function of property (Sampay, 2012, vol. 3, p. 22; Diario, vol. 1, 315) . This paucity of references to the founder of the social function of property, a founder who had significant ties to Argentina, Buenos Aires, and legal education in the country, is striking. In Sampay's thought, Thomas Aquinas provided the theoretical basis for the social function of property which, in turn, could be put into practice through redistributive projects, such as agrarian reform, for the benefit of society.
Valenzuela argued along the same lines, but elaborated on these themes and cited Duguit in his intervention (Koenig, 117) . Valenzuela asserted that individual liberties, such as the right to property, were not ends unto themselves, but rather were to serve the well-being and development of the collective. Such liberties had a social function (Ramella, 309 Valenzuela discussed several of these constitutional models with particular attention paid to the Martini's views of property were also shaped by Saint Thomas Aquinas and Christian humanism, and, in this way, sought a balancing point between communism and capitalism in the social function of property (Koenig, 117) . Martini spoke at length about the history and theory of property and was particularly influenced by Emmanuel Mounier's De la propriété capitaliste à la propriété humaine (Diario, vol. 1, (514) (515) Ramella, 312) . Mounier was a neo-Thomist
Catholic convert and philosopher. The book, published in a series edited by Jacques Maritain, was a primer on Thomist property law reflecting Christian humanism and Catholic social doctrine. It is riddled with citations to Aquinas and peppered with references to the encyclicals of the church's social doctrine. It does not mention Duguit (Mounier) .
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In addition to Mounier, Martini drew from several other neo-Thomist writers including works by the Belgian Christian trade unionist Georges C. Rutten (1875 Rutten ( -1952 and Louis Garriguet (1859 Garriguet ( -1927 (Lane, 828) . Llerena --noted the importance of the common good, service, and human life in relationship to property (Ramella, 328) .
In addition to the answers to this questionnaire, Salvador Dana Montaño, the director of the same institute, offered his thoughts on property in a contribution to a conference on philosophy originally scheduled for 1948 but held a year later. Published as Justicia social y reforma constitucional, the book treated the question of property extensively in seven chapters.
There is not one mention of Duguit, but Dana Montaño makes a rare reference to the Chilean Constitution of 1925 whose property provisions were based directly on Duguit's work (Dana Montaño, 117, Mirow 2011) . His conclusions were in keeping with the ideas expressed above and specifically adopted the viewpoint of Christian humanism over European theorists to place 24 restrictions on the unbridled exercise of property (Dana Montaño; Ramella, (329) (330) . Although employing distinct terminology, these professors all sought to modify the idea of an absolute right to private property by tempering it with some sense of social obligations to the common good, the collective, and the human being (Ramella, 328) .
Deputies and professors supported Sampay's adoption of the social function of property.
Further support may have been found in Sampay's vision of constitutional goals. Apparently influenced by the political writings of Ferdinand Lassalle, Sampay sought constitutions that reflected reality as much as possible rather than those that expounded an ideal structure or goals detached from actual constitutional and state practice (Arias Pelerano, 20; Sampay 1973, 37-39) .
This view aligned well with Duguit's presentation of the social function of property in which he asserted that property as a social function was a presently accurate description of property based on numerous illustrations gathered by Duguit from French law (Mirow 2011 (Mirow , 1192 . Thus, in the pursuit of real constitutionalism, Sampay, if he were directly aware of Duguit's arguments for the social function, would have been drawn to their present descriptive, rather than future normative, force.
Recognizing a second practical aspect of changing the nature of property in Argentina,
Sampay also knew that this new definition of property had to be extended from constitutional language into the everyday applicable language of the civil law, a new civil code. As Sampay noted in this context, "with the exception of family law, the civil code is nothing more than the ordering of property law" (Diario, vol. 1, 279) . Because a civil code was built on the concept of property, the social function of property would become the central aspect of a new civil code (Koenig, (136) (137) . As Sofanor Novillo Corvalán commented after the incorporation of the social function of property into the Constitution of 1949, property in Argentina operated on at least two planes, a constitutional level dealing with the state and a codified level governing the day-to-day notions of title and ownership (Ramella, 330) . Nonetheless, the projection of the social function of property into the sources of applicable private law in Argentina was not accomplished. This lack of penetration into the civil law meant that there were various levels within which the interpretation of property could take place (Ramella, 352 ).
Even on the constitutional level, the redefinition of property had striking consequences.
Private property was not abolished; it now had a double function, one individual and another social. The social function of property justified "anti-imperialist" projects of nationalization and the expropriation of foreign capital within Perón's particular interpretation of Christian humanism (Koenig, (144) (145) . The debates of the drafters and particularly the work and interventions of Arturo Enrique Sampay reveal the rhetorical strategies used to incorporate this radically new, yet politically consistent, construction of property into the Peronist constitution.
Successful constitutional reform only occurs at particular political moments. Peronists observed the compatibility of the social function of property with many of their constitutional and legal reforms. They surely noted the flexibility and utility of the doctrine.
The Constitution of 1949 was not long-lived. It was abolished by military dictators and erased from the political and legal history of Argentina (Koenig, (31) (32) . In 1955, anti-Peronists ushered in a coup under Eduardo Lonardi, a national Catholic military officer (Koenig, 211) . On
April 27, 1956, President Aramburu decreed that the Constitution of 1949 was derogated and that the Constitution of 1853/1860 with subsequent amendments was in force (Koenig, 231) . This decree marked the end of the social function of property in Argentina and a return of the absolute 26 protection of private property under classical liberalism and the Constitution of 1853/1860 (Ramella, 308-309; Sampay 1973, 122-124) . There were some unsuccessful attempts to introduce the social function of property during the constituent convention of 1957, especially as it was tied to agrarian reform and the redistribution of land (Ramella, 351) . author (Bonilla, 1154 (Bonilla, -1159 . Brazil, however, adopted a social function of property without direct reference to Duguit, but the influence of Duguit's thought on developments in the country remains unsettled (Crawford, Cunha) .
Just as Latin American countries adopted the social function of property in various ways and at different times, they employed the term and its theory in different political contexts and with different goals in mind. The Peronist adoption of the social function of property was consistent with contemporaneous constructions of a Peronist state, economy, and political structure. Peronists interpreted "social function" in light of the political exigencies pressing on the state, the economy, and its legal system. Not recognizing the political and legal malleability of the term, those leading the coup of 1955 determined that such a term and its interpretation had best be abolished rather than adapted.
This rejection of the social function of property in Argentina may be contrasted with appropriation of the social function of property in Chile by left and right. Both Presidents Allende and Pinochet found the term useful because each could carefully design programs, policies, and actions around their own definition of the "social function" (Mirow 2011 (Mirow , 1216 (Mirow -1217 . In these contexts, "social function" has no fixed meaning and suffered from indeterminacy (Esquirol, (340) (341) . Indeed, in the context of the Argentine Constitution of 1949, the scholar Carlos Enrique Mackinnon observed that an inherent danger in the social function of property was its openness to various interpretations by leaders and politicians with opposite ideas of government and the common good (Ramella, 330) .
Diversity of legal experience exists not only in the exterior but also within the interior.
This study has focused exclusively on national developments. In a country as varied as
Argentina and with a history of strong regional distinctions and federalism, interesting work remains to be done on the provincial level and particularly with the incorporation of the social function of property into provincial constitutions. Indeed, Koenig noted the existence of 14 provincial constitutions that incorporated the social function doctrine, and Parise also mentioned the doctrine in several provincial constitutions (Koenig, 43; Parise, 217) . The use of provincial sources in this national development remains unknown.
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Similarly, this study has made only passing reference to civil codes and judicial opinions.
In Minerals, water courses, deposits of oil, carbon and gas and the other natural sources of energy, with the exception of vegetables, are the unassignable and inalienable property of the Nation with the corresponding participation in their production as shall be convenient for the provinces.
Public services belong originally to the state and under no condition may they be transferred or conceded for their exploitation. Those that find themselves under the power of individuals shall be transferred to the state, through sale or expropriation with prior indemnification when determined by national law.
The price for the expropriation of business concessions of public services shall be the original cost of the goods as affected by the exploitation less the sums that have amortized during the lapse completed from the grant of the concession and the excess above a reasonable profit which shall also be considered as the recovery of investment capital.
